

Review Article:

New Works on Kant's Practical Philosophy

- Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A German-English Edition* Edited and translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann
Cambridge University Press 2011
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- Jens Timmermann, (ed.) *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide*
Cambridge University Press 2009
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- Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann, (eds.) *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide*
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(ISBN: 978-0-521-89685-6) hb v + 226 £53.00
- Lara Denis, (ed.) *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide* Cambridge University Press 2010
(ISBN: 978-0-521-51393-7) hb v + 270 £53.00
- Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth, (eds.) *Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics* Cambridge University Press 2011 (ISBN: 978-0-521-51525-2) hb v + 308 £50.00

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Work on the related but distinct topics of Kant's ethics and Kantian ethics has taken off apace in recent years as the prodigious amount of work produced in these volumes attests. Until recently, work on the specific topic of Kant's ethics ranged no further than discussions of some standard topics in the *Groundwork* but, whilst work on the *Groundwork* is still produced – and some of it is very fine – it is no longer automatic to think that writing about it is equivalent to writing about Kant's ethics. Similarly, the topics of “Kantian ethics” in a broader sense, whilst still inclusive of important discussions of standard

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topics, has broadened in recent years to include wide ranging accounts of moral psychology, virtue, and anthropology.

The new bi-lingual edition of the *Groundwork* that has been prepared here by Jens Timmermann is a handsome and useful volume that will enrich any Kantian researcher's library. Timmermann has reprinted Mary Gregor's translation of the work and placed it alongside the German text of the second edition of the original work. Timmermann has, however, thoroughly revised Gregor's translation and replaced some of her renditions of terms. This edition also contains a number of editorial notes, pointing out the differences between the first two editions of Kant's work, commenting on specific translation choices, and, perhaps most usefully of all, there is an index of key terms, both English and German. The provision of the bi-lingual text will be an immense help to serious scholars of Kant and Timmermann is greatly to be commended for having provided it.

Amongst the wealth of riches that the other works under review present it is perhaps fitting to begin with the new "critical guide" that Jens Timmermann has produced on the *Groundwork*. It contains eleven essays on different aspects of the work. Paul Guyer's contribution to the volume claims to deal both with the argument as set out in the third part of the *Groundwork* and to relate this argument to the subsequent emendations Kant made to it. On Guyer's construal Kant argues in *Groundwork* III that the noumenal self is the basis of the constitution of the subject so that there is nothing in the phenomenal self that is not contained in the noumenal self. Guyer presents the argument of *Groundwork* III as consisting in a move from a negative conception of freedom (identified by him with the "good will") to a positive conception (equivalent to autonomy) and from the latter to the moral law. However, this is still the analytic part of the argument. The real "deduction" begins, with the claim that there is a key distinction between passivity and activity, and moves from this to an understanding of inner sense as an appearance. The result is that the spontaneous self is, by contrast, noumenal and governed purely by reason.

The advantage of this construal is that it ensures that the argument of *Groundwork* III really does complete the discussion of the moral law by showing a rationale for thinking of it as applying to us. However, the disadvantage is that Guyer's account still leaves the argument of *Groundwork* III faulty since, as he puts it, we need a "more positive account of knowledge of the in-itself" than we derive from this argument. One of the reasons why we do is that it remains unclear how immoral action is possible on the account Guyer has given. Thus the rationale Guyer provides for a change from the *Groundwork* account to that of the *Critique of Practical Reason* is to address this problem.¹

For Guyer, the change in the argument in the *Critique of Practical Reason* is motivated by a "reversal" of direction so that Kant now derives freedom from the moral law rather than vice versa.² However, Guyer's interpretation of the latter argument turns on more than this claim since he takes the primary proof of freedom in the later work to turn on a claim about the *purity* of our knowledge of the moral law, thus on our consciousness of its rationality rather than on its obligatoriness. According to Guyer, the purity of the faculty of reason that apprehends the moral law enables us to infer the purity of the will that is at issue in it without requiring us to make claims about freedom. The key principle would simply be that knowledge of the necessity that is expressed in the moral law could never arise from anything empirical. So it is the moral law that makes our sense of the noumenal determinate rather than the noumenal being what guarantees the moral law. However, the difficulty with this construal of

¹ In fact Guyer takes there to be three problems left over from *Groundwork* III, an epistemic problem concerning the basis of the reference to reason, a metaphysical problem concerning how the phenomenal and noumenal selves can be in struggle with each other if the latter is the foundation of the former and the practical problem concerning freedom stressed above. But I will be focusing only on the last in relation to Guyer's interpretation.

² In making this claim Guyer follows an illustrious tradition of interpretation. For classic sources of it see Dieter Henrich (1975) "The Deduction of the Moral Law: The Reasons for the Obscurity of the Final Section of Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*" (1998 trans. by P. Guyer) in P. Guyer (ed.) *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays* (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham), pp. 303-41 and Henry E. Allison (1990) *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge University Press), Chapters 12 and 13.

the argument of the *Critique of Practical Reason* is that it leaves the practical problem Guyer posed about the *Groundwork* III argument entirely undisturbed.³

If Guyer's contribution focused on a revisionist account of the general basis for Kant's claim that the moral law applies to us, Katrin Flikschuh, by contrast, looks instead at the status of Kant's appeal to the notion of the "kingdom of ends". Like Guyer, Flikschuh finds Kant's discussion of the "kingdom of ends" to be substantively metaphysical, but defends Kant's right to make this appeal against interpreters who would wish instead to give it a "purely political" status. Flikschuh is troubled by the rise of non-metaphysical interpretations of Kantian principles, particularly in the service of political philosophy. Part of her argument is that such readings distort the basic orientation of Kant's own political philosophy which depends not, on her view, on appeals to autonomous willing, but instead on external coercibility.

Flikschuh defends the metaphysical status of Kant's arguments not by reference to theoretical assertions, but, rather, by means of the status that is given to practical metaphysics. Going back to the second part of the *Groundwork* she appeals to Kant's characterisation of the will as a rational power that is autonomous but this analysis is not one that she thinks leads easily to applied ethics.

Taking issue with John Rawls' view of the result of the introduction of the formula of the law of nature⁴, Flikschuh assumes that Kant's formulas in the second part of the *Groundwork* are consistently metaphysical and culminate in an account of a non-sensible substantive end. But there is a significant peculiarity to how Flikschuh sees this practical metaphysics in relation to the notion of the "kingdom of ends" since she does not view it as involving "a normatively co-legislated realm", but instead argues that a

³ This leads Guyer to favour instead an argument he derives from Kant's work on *Religion* though the argument he finds there does not so much as address the problems located in the earlier works as provide a reason for ordering principles differently.

⁴ Rawls' discussion of this is best explored in J. Rawls (2000) *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy* (ed. by B. Herman, Harvard University Press), pp. 162-80.

self-legislating will can arrive at the idea of the kingdom of ends independently of the willing of other rational agents.⁵

The reading that Flikschuh is arguing against is one that she takes to be informed by a “political” rather than metaphysical conception of the “kingdom of ends”. In place of this view Flikschuh offers, however, a form of fideism, which aligns the discussion of the “kingdom of ends” with the practical postulates of the second *Critique*. In making this move she ignores the rather more plausible metaphysical reading of the kingdom of ends that would align it instead with the *summum bonum* of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, an alignment that is explicitly made in the latter work where Kant distinguishes between an “ethical community” and a “political community” (Ak. 6: 96). Flikschuh is certainly right to stress the distinction between virtue and right but resting the former on fideism is a somewhat dismaying result of her reading.

Alison Hills, in contrast to both Guyer and Flikschuh, focuses not on the metaphysical status of some of Kant’s claims in the *Groundwork* but instead on the account Kant gives of “happiness” in the work. Hills argues that Kant’s view of “happiness” rests on a desire-satisfaction theory but, whilst this is not itself a particularly controversial view of “happiness”, what does trouble many is Kant’s pessimism about our prospects of attaining it. Hills looks at the basis of Kant’s account of “happiness” distinguishing between his discussion of its value and its pursuit. With regard to the “value” of “happiness” Kant is keen to argue that it is not sufficient on its own to be accounted the *summum bonum* and Hills points out that the “paradox of hedonism” does provide support for Kant’s claim here.⁶ Similarly, Kant appeals to anthropological observations in his description of how social life makes competitive comparison a central part of our striving and distorts our ability to rest content. This latter point involves a kind of Rousseauian pessimism about

⁵ Hence Flikschuh’s reading cuts against the influential one offered by Christine Korsgaard (1996) *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge University Press).

⁶ The paradox that happiness might be best achieved by not making it our direct end has consistently troubled hedonists.

the results of civilization and points also to the basis of the kind of suspicion of reason that has been noted by philosophers since Plato.

Despite these pessimistic conjectures, however, Kant does claim that the end of “happiness” is an actual one that we can be counted on to possess but the ground of this claim has struck many as obscure. In assessing it Hills turns from the *Groundwork* account to that given in the *Critique of Practical Reason* where the pursuit of “happiness” is presented as based on how an empirical concept of an object of feeling is taken to be a “good” for us with reference to our sensibility due to its fitting an instrumental aim we have adopted. Hills, in a lengthy comparison between Kant’s view and that of Thomas Nagel, describes why this conception has to be one that transcends mere preference for present desires in order to enable future gratification to be possible. On this conception, whilst “happiness” is not a direct end of action, it is regulative of our constraint of ends by imposing a kind of rule of prudence that is directive of hypothetical imperatives. This is the basis for claiming that “happiness” is an end we will all accept as being one we have to adopt.

Jens Timmermann’s own contribution to the collection on the *Groundwork* that he has edited focuses on the first part of the work, a part that, whilst relatively accessible, is not necessarily straightforward to interpret. Timmermann’s account of *Groundwork* I looks at the way in which it presents Kant’s “motivational rigorism”, that is, the thesis that the moral worth of actions rests on their conformity to duty rather than on the presence of beneficent inclinations. This discussion includes the famous examples of the prudent shopkeeper and the kind-hearted philanthropist, neither of whose actions are strictly speaking ones that have true “moral worth”. The latter case has proved more controversial but Timmermann stresses that the point of the contrast between the philanthropist and the determination by duty is to show that the latter requires autonomy to be decisive for moral action.

Having brought out the basic case for Kant's discussion of acting from duty Timmermann proceeds to address the obvious question of whether it follows from Kant's argument that all dutiful actions should be determined by reason alone. The *object* of the will, in moral deliberation, is not inclination but the moral law. Action that is itself concerned with the realisation of something commanded by the moral law should simply be focused, as action, on this rather than on bringing about something pleasing. Inclination, by contrast, has only an indirect relation to action as action is viewed by it in relation to an end that the action is connected to. Inclination could be satisfied by the consequences of an action done from duty but it is still not the object of the action to produce such satisfaction. However, Timmermann does not view the reference to the law as one that rules out an understanding of the needs of others since it rather directs us to assess situations.

In addition to the pieces discussed above, Timmermann's collection on the *Groundwork* contains seven other chapters, including two others on the third part of the work (by John Skorupski and Frederick Rauscher), pieces on the formula of humanity (by Oliver Sensen) and the moral law as causal law (by Robert Johnson), a response to Kant's rejection of alternative principles of morality (by J.B. Schneewind) and more anthropologically oriented pieces (by Robert Louden and Manfred Kuehn). Notably, a number of pieces in the collection reach beyond the specific arguments of the *Groundwork* to other elements of Kant's views, ensuring that the collection has a wider appeal than its title might suggest. Overall this collection brings together important work by significant commentators and is an invaluable resource.

Andrews Reath and Jens Timmermann have collaborated to produce a general guide to Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* which, though it includes fewer essays than Timmermann's collection on the *Groundwork*, is seriously to be welcomed for providing a guide to perhaps Kant's least visited Critical text. Heiner F. Klemme opens the collection with a piece focused on the aim of the *Critique*,

which includes the provision of the antinomy of pure practical reason, something not discussed in the *Groundwork*. Klemme also rightly emphasises that if the *Critique of Pure Reason*'s main task is to limit the vaulting pretensions of theoretical reason, the *Critique of Practical Reason*, by contrast, is mainly a response to those sceptical of the claims of pure practical reason. This includes a demonstration of how the concept of causality through freedom has a non-empirical meaning. Klemme's discussion ranges widely, commenting on various conceptions Kant appears to have entertained during the Critical decade about the form of the Critical system.

Klemme finds the replacement of the "natural dialectic" referred to in *Groundwork* I with the dialectic of pure practical reason in the *Critique of Practical Reason* to be central to the development of the latter work. The development of the dialectic of pure practical reason enables Kant to arrive at a parallel between speculative and practical applications of pure reason in terms of each referring to the unconditioned. It also enables the claim about the unconditioned validity of the moral law to be defended by setting up the obvious alternative to the moral law – happiness – and showing the basis for a relation between the two. Further, the development of this dialectic enables practical reason to become emancipated, on Klemme's view, from theoretical reason.

By contrast to Klemme, Reath's contribution focuses on the condition of the practical law that Kant defends in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the condition, namely, that it determine choice through form rather than matter. Kant defends the view that the form of a law is common to both natural and practical laws in the "typic" where a law of nature is argued to provide us with the "type" of law for the appraisal of actions. This is contrasted with material principles that are based on object-dependence. However, as Reath emphasises, this does not entail that Kant is committed to a view of practical law that cannot incorporate "matter", as it is precisely such matter that provides us with reasons for action in given cases. But the "matter" is not the

ground of choice by itself as maxims have to have law-like form to be capable of being adopted. The problem with material principles is the way they require reference to “interests” whereas a formal view of law requires the matter of the principle to have the form of a law.

The practical form of law specifies constraints on how matter can be understood and which kinds of considerations apply to the different types of matter that can be given. So it gives a norm that activities have to be governed by. This picture of agency is contrasted by Reath with the one given in the third part of the *Groundwork* as the latter explicitly builds in a reference to a self-conception of freedom. Reath sees the *Groundwork* claim as implying that the formal principle of morality is the principle of volition in general whilst the *Critique of Practical Reason*, by contrast, sees it as only the formal principle of *pure* volition. So, in a sense, Reath takes the second *Critique* to provide a more comprehensive picture of practical volition than the *Groundwork*. What accompanies this is a firm and clear portrayal of the difference between viewing the right as having priority over the good and taking the reverse position. One of the grounds for this is Kant’s critical dissection of claims that material ends could have necessary claims on the will.

Pierre Keller’s contribution looks at how the “Critical Elucidation” with which Kant closes the “analytic” of the *Critique of Practical Reason* involves a defence of a form of “compatibilism”. The argument of the “Critical Elucidation” is a kind of practical syllogism that distinguishes between theoretical and practical reason and describes the basis for specific categorical obligations to act. The a priori principles of practical reason are, however, to be established from common-sense reasoning. But the kind of proof of practical reason that results does not match the standards of theoretical reason. This is due to the point that practical principles cannot be based on empirical standards or psychophysical laws. Similarly, Kant rules out claims that specific states of psychological kind could themselves be based on immediate creation. What follows from this is that agency

cannot be subsumed under empirical causal notions or deterministic super-sensible ones.

This is the ground for Keller taking Kant to see autonomy as grounded only in the space of reasons or, in other words, on un-conditioned reasons. So Keller sees the result of the argument as being that absolute spontaneity is the condition of moral autonomy. This seems to warrant a kind of compatibilism between freedom and determinism, however, only on the grounds that they address different kinds of explanation of conduct and thus to also be counted, in another way, as a form of incompatibilism.

Stefano Bacin's contribution is, unusually, focused on the relatively brief "doctrine of method" of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. As Bacin states, it is not the most innovative part of the work but that Kant chose to conclude with it is surely worthy of comment all the same. All the Critical works contain some form of "doctrine of method" so it was evidently a serious part of Kant's architectonic design. In the case of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, according to Bacin, Kant uses this section to set out formulations concerning how practical concepts and principles are to be put into practice. This includes an account of how the laws of pure practical reason can have influence on maxims, the ways in which one can make objectively practical reason subjectively practical and the ways in which it is possible to produce genuine morality of dispositions. Essentially then, it is the part of the work intended to connect philosophical inquiry to the life of moral subjects.

Given these aims, it is unsurprising that Bacin connects the Doctrine of Method with the *Triebfeder* chapter of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. One of the forms of such connection is through a description of how "receptivity" to morality takes place. It includes a discussion of moral education in order to demonstrate the claim that only respect for the law teaches us to feel our own dignity. In a sense these claims are amplified in later Critical works, particularly in the discussion of "natural predispositions" that takes place in both the *Religion* and the Doctrine of Virtue. The discussion is intended to provide means to bring us to

recognise that the humanity expressed in the moral law is our own “proper self”. It is also meant to weigh against popular presentations of morality that Kant viewed as harmful. The pedagogical devices highlighted here include ways of paying attention to the morally salient features of action and to draw attention to the purity of will that such recognition requires. Bacin’s piece serves well as a demonstration of the reasons why Kant concluded with this discussion and an account of what we can continue to learn by paying attention to it.

In addition to the pieces discussed, the Reath and Timmermann collection also includes a discussion of the “fact of reason” (by Pauline Kleingeld), a discussion of the “deduction” provided within it and its relationship to *Groundwork* III (by Timmermann), an account of the *Triebfeder* chapter (by Stephen Engstrom), a general account of the antinomy (by Eric Watkins) and a specific discussion of the idea of practical postulates (by Marcus Willaschek). Overall it is an invaluable addition to the still surprisingly small literature on the second *Critique*.

If, however, the literature on the *Critique of Practical Reason* is less developed in Anglo-American treatments than one might like, that on the *Metaphysics of Morals* is still in its infancy so Lara Denis’s collection of essays is certainly welcome. Divided as the *Metaphysics of Morals* is between the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue it also tends to be the case that essays addressing the work only focus on one or the other half and essays are generally lacking which explore the unity of the work. This is unfortunately also true here though a number of the specific essays are very useful in focusing on distinct topics and areas.

Otfried Höffe’s discussion of the notion of “innate right” that Kant introduces in the Doctrine of Right brings out well that it is the point of this work to provide a general systematic discussion of right. The notion of “rights” is one that is related clearly by Kant to the status of “persons” in connection to universal laws of freedom. The emphasis on freedom is central to the internal coherence of right for Kant

but since this also indicates that right is grounded in an initial conception of constraint it also points, for Höffe, to a generally negative and defensive status for the notion of right. However, Höffe recognises a positive sense to right in the notion of the unification of wills, a unification that requires reference to a sense of “consent” implied in the constraint on freedom that will be established. The point of such consent is that it involves trading the insecurity of the state of nature – in which there is no guarantee even of the right to life – for a condition in which right is realised by means of mutually agreed restrictions on freedom.

Höffe sees the justification of the universal principle of right to arise from applying a moral perspective to an empirical condition in the sense that the co-existence of persons is a given to which moral subjects have to respond in a way that is consistent with their moral status. This is taken by Höffe to require an anthropological consideration to be built into right in a way that is not evident for pure practical reason alone. It does, however, draw also upon the noumenal sense of humanity. The constitution of the legal condition is thereby mandated morally even though the nature of its demands is distinct from that of morality strictly speaking. One of the ways the legal condition recognises morality, however, is precisely by means of its account of a person, as this account is one that refers us to the “right of humanity” where “humanity” refers us back to the understanding of it given in Kant’s general moral theory.

Höffe’s exciting discussion concludes with a disappointingly brief account of the basic “innate right” that Kant defends, a right related to the notion of what is “internally mine and yours” that is at the root of the general concept of possession. Höffe wishes to show that this “innate right” is not merely provisionally recognised in Kant’s theory but is centrally connected to his overall justification of public right but his discussion of the latter appears only quickly towards the close of his article so is insufficiently justified.

If Höffe provides a general background to the notion of right such that we can see its relationship to Kant’s general moral philosophy, Sharon Byrd, by contrast, focuses specifi-

cally on the question of the justification Kant provides for having external objects of choice as one's own. As she rightly points out, this discussion is broader than is often assumed since it includes not only rights to property but also contractual rights and family rights. Central to Byrd's argument, however, is the key point that the justification of rights to external objects of choice is strictly independent of Kant's account of public right.

Byrd focuses her attention on the conception Kant defends of "intelligible possession", a view that bases possession on a duty others have towards me, namely, to leave alone that which I possess intelligibly. If this is the prime notion underlying the right to have external objects of choice then the justification of the latter will depend on the way that Kant defends it. The basic claim to external objects of choice is given in the postulate of practical reason and Kant justifies this in the first place, as Höffe also emphasised, by means of a *reductio* argument concerning the realisation of freedom. The postulate is, however, described by Kant as a "permissive law" and the question of the meaning of this designation is specifically addressed by Byrd as this term, as it is used in the Doctrine of Right, tends to be assimilated to a quite different meaning given to it in *Perpetual Peace*. According to *Perpetual Peace* a "permissive law" authorises a wrongful state of affairs provisionally until it can be gradually reformed. This, however, is not the way Kant discusses "permissive law" in the Doctrine of Right as the postulate of practical reason states a condition that is meant to apply in an unrestricted way.

Byrd also partially corrects Mary Gregor's translation of the Doctrine of Right in order to bring out the basic structure of Kant's argument better. Rather than assuming that taking un-owned objects does not violate anyone's freedom of choice, as Gregor's translation suggests, Kant argues only that it cannot be wrong to use objects of choice so long as this does not violate anyone's freedom of choice. The latter point is illustrated by means of the *reductio* argument that shows the incoherence that would result unless there was a right to take un-owned objects of choice as one's own.

Byrd's point about the expansive sense of external objects of choice further demonstrates that Kant cannot be taking the expression "permissive law" in the Doctrine of Right in the way he does in *Perpetual Peace*. Byrd's positive construal of "permissive law" in the Doctrine of Right is that it is a power-conferring norm, a view based on her interpretation of the relationship between Kant's discussion and that of previous writers on the subject. Byrd's article subsequently goes on to connect the general account of intelligible possession to the original right of all to a place on the limited sphere of the earth and provides a sterling defence of the general claim that the right to intelligible possession is a form of "natural" right that is thus pre-political.

Allen Wood's contribution focuses on the vexed topic of Kant's view of punishment. Kant's justification of it has generally been viewed as an example of retributivism though Wood points out that it is part of Kant's point that the concept of punishment constrains the conduct of those who administer its infliction in certain ways. However, Kant does also appear to adopt the view that the moral relation between the criminal act and the institutions of justice is one that requires punishment to be inflicted. This point appears to be related to Kant's claim that there is a "categorical imperative" at issue here which requires that punishment be administered simply because the crime has been committed, a point that precludes taking into consideration the kinds of appeal that are often made in deterrence theories of punishment. So the ultimate moral justification of punishment for Kant seems to be retributivist, a point that transcends his apparently analytic remarks about the connection between crime and punishment.

Despite referring back to the categorical imperative, however, Wood affects to find no specific argument by Kant in favour of retributivism. Part of the reason why Wood takes this line appears to be that Kant accepts that punishment has a kind of deterrent aim, in presenting to the potential criminal some grounds for not committing criminal acts. However, as Wood's own account brings out, Kant's more basic reason resides in his point about the need to

hinder hindrances to freedom and deterrence is only referred to in relation to this over-arching end. Since coercion is often necessary to safeguard rightful freedom and criminal acts aim at undermining it, the self-rectification of freedom requires that criminal acts be punished. Wood seems to take retributivism to be an expansion upon this claim as he sees this claim to be merely analytic whereas the retributivist claim is one he views as synthetic. But it is hard to see how it could fail to follow from the general claim about justification of coercion that there is a justification of punishment. The notion of retributivism is a way of explaining to the criminal the point that the rightful system is to be kept in equilibrium.

Wood suggests that Kant's view of punishment is not derived directly from Kant's general moral philosophy but surely this is unnecessary as the right of coercion is derived from the supreme principle of right and it is this latter that governs the general consideration of right. Wood retreats to general ethical considerations about the claim of others to happiness but neglects to consider the ways that criminal conduct undercuts the ability to actualise such claims. Wood's overall reasons for resisting Kant's retributivism seem to rest, as the final section of his article suggests, on the problem with seeing actual legal institutions as justified but this is a separate problem from considering the justification of punishment within the theory of right. Finally, even though Wood takes Kant not to have justified retributivism, he does conclude with a call for a Kantian theory that would justify it.

Jeanine Grenberg's article is different from those previously discussed as it focuses on a specific question that arises from the Doctrine of Virtue concerning the question of what it is that opposes virtue. In looking at this question she compares the approaches taken in the Doctrine of Virtue and the *Religion*. One conventional rendering of Kant's thought has inclination cast as the basis of resistance to virtue but Grenberg identifies some problems with taking this line, not least that inclinations, so viewed, would appear to be cast as simple natural forces and thus hardly

assimilable at all to the thought of freedom that underlies Kant's general account.

So if what opposes virtue is something for which we can be held accountable, it cannot be something that appears merely as external to reason. This points Grenberg to the position that is more properly Kantian, namely that "vice" is "an intentional transgression" that has taken on the status of a principle (Ak. 6: 390). On this view, dispositions, not inclinations only, are the true enemy of virtue. So vice is something chosen freely and hence has to be combatted by means of freedom. Vicious realisations of freedom are ways in which freedom is put at variance with itself. On this basis Grenberg compares Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of virtue and suggests that the Aristotelian view is one that requires of us more than we could give.

In addition to the topics discussed there are a number of other pieces in Denis' volume that are worthy of mention. Denis herself contributes an interesting piece on duties to oneself, Robert Johnson addresses the converse topic of duties towards others, Patrick Kain discusses duties towards animals and Thomas Hill assesses the Doctrine of Virtue as a contribution to normative ethics. There are also contributions by Katrin Flikschuh, Stephen Engstrom, Manfred Kuehn and Paul Guyer. Whilst a number of these pieces will invite dispute the opening of such dispute around the central questions of the *Metaphysics of Morals* is greatly to be welcomed as is this addition to the literature upon it.

If the other volumes are, however, intended to provide a specific guide to some elements of *Kant's* ethics, the volume co-edited by Lawrence Jost and Julian Wuerth, by contrast, is concerned with *Kantian* ethics and, specifically, its relation to "virtue ethics".⁷ Hence it is intended to provoke a debate of sorts between two contemporary positions in

⁷ The distinction between *Kant's* ethics and *Kantian* ethics is well described by Allen Wood as a contrast between "the theory Kant himself put forward" on the one hand, and, "an ethical theory formulated in the basic spirit of Kant", on the other. The latter, as Wood writes, is intended to be a present "theoretical option in thinking about ethical questions and philosophical questions about ethics" which is not answerable to textual accuracy or exegetical standards of Kant interpretation. See Allen W. Wood (2008) *Kantian Ethics* (Cambridge University Press), p. 1.

ethical theory. However, despite this general aim of the collection, some contributors to it are sceptical of the endeavour, some due to a simple preference for Kantian ethics *rather than* “virtue ethics”, others due to possession of the opposite conviction but some others due to a problem they voice with the whole direction of ethical theory as presently constituted. Amongst the latter are, for example, Timothy Chappell whose concluding essay provides some questions, which are, I think, worth addressing prior to turning to other pieces in the volume.

Chappell’s contribution is set up as a specific response to what he terms the “paradox” of deontology. The “paradox” is one that is typically set out by consequentialists when objecting to the standard deontological position of arguing that it requires us not to adopt the strategy of always pursuing what it has defined as the “good” due to its reference to constraints on action. As Chappell points out, this “paradox” is misnamed since it is really a kind of *reductio* argument that requires us to reject the conception of these constraints but which could instead be responded to by denying that it is the role of agency to bring about goodness.

Chappell does not, in arguing this, endorse what we might take to be the most plausible suggestion here of articulating the ground for the priority of the right over the good.⁸ This is because Chappell’s focus is on the kinds of “intuition” he thinks distinct moral theories appeal to and he views “deontology” as requiring, minimally, the notion that the bringing about of goodness is, simply, *not all* that agency is about. It is the conception that agency *is* entirely about this that reveals a basic commitment to consequentialism and consequentialists often simply assume that the rest of us will accept this. Often this commitment is expressed as a sense that agency should aim to “realize” a value and, as against

⁸ For a particularly fine example of an argument for this see Samuel Freeman (1994) “Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right” in S. Freeman (2007) *Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy* (Oxford University Press), 45-74. Freeman would reject Chappell’s use of the term “deontology” as Chappell takes it as effectively equivalent to the notion of the priority of the right over the good in his introductory comments but this point would require a separate discussion from that which can be given here so will be ignored here.

this, “deontology” can assert, for example, that expressive commitments are not about such realizations.

So Chappell assumes that a conception that agency is pluralist, in the sense that it has a number of permissible roles, is a deontological commitment that can be set against the monistic view of agency that consequentialism assumes. The monistic view of consequentialism is one that Chappell takes to be based on a kind of theoretical tidiness that leaves aside important intuitions about the moral life and, for the purposes of this review, the most important feature of his contribution, concerns whether Kant can recognise the plurality of agency.

Chappell takes Kant to have an expressive view of agency and bases this mainly on the account of the “good will” in the first part of the *Groundwork* as well as being indicated in Kant’s account of punishment in the *Metaphysic of Morals* (itself taken to be retributive precisely in expressing a commitment to “respect”). Chappell does view Kant as recognising, however, the plural character of agency but as committed to the conception that only one type of agency really has *moral* value. Chappell’s article partly draws on some theological comparisons between Kant and Luther but Chappell’s “objection” to Kant seems to rest principally on a conception of moral agency that only works if we accept his commitment to the noumenal self. Even more ambitiously, Chappell ties *Kantian* ethics to a general acceptance of *Kant’s* philosophical system, something that would require all variants of the former to repetition of the latter, which is rather implausible. Despite this problem with Chappell’s essay it is still the case that it highlights an important point in stressing the plural character of agency in non-consequentialist views of morality.

Nancy Sherman’s contribution is more focused than that of Chappell, looking not at very general issues but at a very specific one, the treatment of anger in Aristotle, the Stoics and Kant. Opening with striking discussions of vengeful anger in both contemporary Iran and classical Greece and contrasting these cases with an account of moral anger in My Lai, Sherman’s point is to arrive at a careful classi-

fication of types of anger. Beginning with Aristotle, Sherman brings out how his appraisal view of anger shows this emotion to rest on an evaluation of real or imagined events in addition to action tendencies. Aristotle views a failure to be angry at things one ought to be as a moral failing, indicating either foolishness or servility.

By contrast to Aristotle, Stoic theorists take a generally dim view of anger, opposing it to the correctly humane spirit. Stoics concentrate on how the distortion of the face and body often produced by anger reflect, on their view, ugly states of mind. This is part of the general Stoic claim that emotions are perverted or false opinions and an insistence on relating to emotion as things we can control. The Stoic view of emotion generally is relentlessly negative taking them to give us only false evaluations of goods and evils. This does, however, mean that the Stoics were incapable of distinguishing between different types of anger, essentially failing thereby to focus on the reasons why anger could be a justified response to a situation. The Stoics, writing in a world in which many were enslaved, strove to teach a lesson for how one could conceal the outrage one might feel at something, in order to prevent the situation from getting worse. It is also true, as Sherman notes, that revenge anger in particular, does make us today somewhat uneasy.

However, it is clear that Sherman faults the Stoics for their generally negative view of anger and failure to allow that it could both have just cause and be something that could be expressed in ways that are themselves righteous. Whilst Kant's view of pathological emotion often echoes the negative Stoic evaluation, however, he does not view emotion as focused primarily on *objects* but as concerned instead with our relations to other *persons*. The point of this difference is that Kant's problem with pathological emotion is grounded on his aim of safeguarding dignity, not with a concern with "happiness". However it is precisely this that enables Kant to motivate a rich conception of "practical" feeling that can be distinguished from pathological feeling and allow for an understanding of the different sorts of anger

that Sherman wishes recognised. So Kant, like Aristotle, and unlike the Stoics, can register the value of righteous anger and relate it to the understanding of self-respect.

Paul Guyer's contribution to the Just and Wuerth volume focuses on the topic of "Kantian perfectionism" and opens with a description of the rationale for Kant's rejection of the Aristotelian notion of the "mean", namely, that the identification of the fundamental principle of duty enables a view of the morally right that cannot be relativized. Guyer's focus on perfectionism, however, is meant to reply not so much to the doctrine of the mean as to Aristotle's focus on the *vita contemplativa*, a focus that is the basis of Aristotle's brand of perfectionism. Kant did not directly respond to Aristotle, however, but to a mediation of his conception by means of Christian Wolff though the latter does adopt a conception of "perfection" that is teleologically based on an understanding of the goods of certain activities and in doing so follows certain trends of Aristotle's thought. Unlike Aristotle, however, Wolff connected his perfectionism to a form of consequentialism that was later amplified by Moses Mendelssohn into an explicit utilitarianism.

In response to the Wolffian tradition Kant emphasizes the unconditional value of the moral agent and relates this to the conditional value of what is freely chosen by such an agent. As in his contribution to the collection on the *Groundwork* so also here Guyer finds the key element of Kant's argument to reside in a view of noumenal character though here this is expanded to incorporate a sense of the good involved in beneficence. Guyer brings out the practical basis of Kant's references to God and how nature can only provide conditions for the indirect realisation of human autonomy. But the central stress of Guyer's piece is that a kind of Kantian perfectionism is justifiable if we focus not on the attainment of certain ends as our goal but rather on the purity of our motive where the latter is given in degrees and capable of being oriented toward an ideal.

Julian Wuerth's contribution is akin to Guyer's in also being focused on agency but looks at a way of comprehending Kant's view of agency that deliberately goes be-

yond the view canvassed in the *Groundwork*. In looking at Kant's later works we will arrive, on Wuerth's view, at a conception of agency that is better fitted to relate to the demands of contemporary virtue ethics than the conception of the *Groundwork* can do. Partly Wuerth's article simply sets out a more extensive view of moral psychology in terms of the views of faculties that Kant provides in other works. This includes an emphasis on how the *Religion* enables an explicit recognition of the distinction between legislative and executive faculties of the will. Wuerth does, however, provide a rationale for why the account of the *Groundwork* has a simpler structure than Kant's accounts elsewhere, namely that Kant wished to set out a clear and explicit difference between his account and those current around him that based themselves on heteronomous empirical ends. Wuerth argues that Kant's overall view of feelings and desires is one that includes a call for the development of the appropriate ones and he connects this to Kant's broader account of higher and lower faculties of cognition, feeling, and desire, something over-simplified in the *Groundwork*.

In addition to the pieces discussed there are eight others included in the Jost and Wuerth volume, some of which (like the contributions of Hursthouse and Brewer) emphasise virtue ethics as against "Kantian" ethics whilst others (like the pieces by Wood and Baron) rather adopt negative evaluations of virtue ethics and reasons why Kant does not advocate a form of it. Whilst Christine Swanton comes perhaps closest to a piece that really focuses on Kantian thought about virtue (discussing in detail his view of love) the volume is notably light on detailed descriptions of what Kantian notions of "virtue" systematically involve. Given the aim of the collection is to promote some form of dialogue between Kantian ethics and virtue ethics it would have been reasonable to expect a sustained article simply focused on a Kantian view of what "virtue" consists in and whether and if so, how, it is different from the view(s) adopted within virtue ethics but this is not directly forthcoming from any of the contributors. Despite this gap the collection as a whole furthers the aim of promoting con-

sideration of whether Kantian ethics is a viable option in contemporary ethical theory.

All of the works under consideration demonstrate clearly the continued vitality of debate around Kant's practical philosophy and point to new trends in the assessment of it. The impact of considering the works together is to suggest a new appetite for more overtly metaphysical forms of Kantian ethics and a certain turn against purely constructivist views of it. Notable also is a continued engagement with the questions, tasks and difficulties of a Kantian theory of moral agency and some of the results of adopting one. The expanded questions that are at work in contemporary debate around Kant's ethics and Kantian ethics do have the tendency, however, of obscuring some key questions that were traditionally taken to be central. Amongst these is a notable lack of concentration on the categorical imperative in these works, something that is both puzzling and regrettable. Despite this being the case there is no doubt that each volume taken separately raises substantive and important philosophical questions, ones worthy of being investigated further and in more detail in later debates and together they illustrate well the wealth of philosophical talent currently devoted to consideration of the Kantian contribution to ethics.